Strategic Transformations in Power and the Nature of International Communication Theory
James W. Chesebro, Jung Kyu Kim, and Donggeol Lee
Ball State University
Keywords: cross-cultural communication theory; multiculturalism; patterns of world domination; Asian communication; China; United States; North Korea; strategy.
This essay was originally designed to provide an extension of Chesebro’s 1996 National Communication Association (NCA) Presidential Address, “Unity in Diversity: Multiculturalism, Guilt/Victimage, and a New Scholarly Orientation.” Holding that NCA must “recognize the emergence of cultural diversity” as “central” to its mission and programs and that it must also view multiculturalism as a system that can “mobilize” and “unify” a “community of scholars” to “act in concert” (p. 10), Chesebro (1996) outlined the values of multiculturalism to NCA and then identified a seven-fold “potential vision” that would allow NCA to promote the “study of communication within a multicultural context” (p. 13).
In this analysis, this vision is extended and provides an updated version of this address that is more oriented to an international audience. When such an international viewpoint is adopted, as this essay evolves and develops through its major stages, we suggest that a core for a powerful cross-cultural perspective has emerged that is particularly relevant and useful when assessing international communication, a perspective that makes us more self-conscious—as a discipline— about the pragmatic bias that has so consistently shaped communication theory, and that ultimately provides a foundation for identifying, characterizing, and distinguishing Western and Eastern strategies employed for dealing with international conflicts. In our view, the recent and ongoing “crisis” with North Korea constitutes a convenient and vivid example of the ways in which the United States and China have each handled an explosive international situation. The totality of this analysis leads us to conclude that the international communication strategies employed by China are more likely to endure and dominate international relations. We begin this analysis by suggesting that multiculturalism is both an essential and necessary framework for characterizing communication both domestically and internationally.
Multiculturalism as a Point of Departure
In Chesebro’s conception in 1996, as a scholarly association often guiding and controlling the direction of research, it was argued that the National Communication Association (NCA) needed to make some adjustments in its philosophical orientations and in the pragmatic programs it sponsored. As a first step, Chesebro argued that NCA had to recognize that multiculturalism can be of benefit to the discipline of communication. Within an association such as NCA, multiculturalism can serve several valuable ends, initially by using multicultural audiences in our research programs, and then by testing the reliability and validity of generalizations and theories against a multicultural foundation, using multiculturalism to identity and rank issues within the discipline of communication, employing multiculturalism as a foundation for viewing communication as international, and finally, using multiculturalism as a base for “re-examining our system of communication ethics” (p. 10).
Given these benefits, Chesebro argued that “as we move into the twenty-first century,” “seven changes” must be undertaken (pp. 13-14). First, as a valuable addition to how communication research is conducted, “multiculturalism must be treated, not as a political issue, but as a scholarly and academic issue.” Second, recognizing that diverse and often contradictory views of reality exist, “multiculturalism must be understood as challenging an existing concept of reality with alternative and more viable views of reality.” Third, being alert to issues such as “anti-Semitism, racism, sexism, homophobia, and ageism,” NCA must be alert to and seek to avoid the “different forms of discrimination” that can affect any organization. Fourth, “as professionals, we need to protect all scholars from the rhetorical excesses that the multicultural conflict can generate.” Fifth, NCA should “incorporate the caucuses [that have traditionally been the system representing diverse cultures] into its governance structure.” Sixth, recognizing that we each have “multiple and contradictory self-definitions” and that “we each represent, constitute, and speak from multiple cultural systems,” “every person needs to understand how he or she is multicultural.” And, seventh, we all “need to participate in a new dialogue regarding these issues, not just those defining themselves as minorities.”
In response to this analysis, the editors of China Media Research specifically encouraged us to provide an “updated version” of this presidential address “that is oriented more to the international audience.” We initially expected that the adoption to an international audience would not involve a fundamental shift in the central principles of Chesebro’s address. We initially thought that it would be possible to provide an extension of each of these seven principles to the study of cross-cultural and international communication. However, as our analysis developed, especially as we considered contemporary case studies as examples, it became clear to us that extensions of Chesebro’s seven principles would be incomplete, if not convey an inappropriate portrayal of the current status of crosscultural and international communication.
We now believe a more profound reconception of cross-cultural and international communication is appropriate simply because so many major and transformational events have occurred since 1996. And, these events have made a major difference in how we understand cross-cultural and international communication. We are particularly moved by the events of September 11, 2001 as well as the subsequent war that the United States has conducted in Iraq. We believe that the international perceptions and understandings of this American initiative is especially important. This entire set of actions and reactions has, we believed, redefined the nature of the international political arena. Given the scope of these observations, our goal in this essay is ultimately heuristic, if not provocative, for we ultimately hope that our major claims in this essay will challenge others and encourage them to respond to us but predominantly we hope that our remarks here will encourage others to address the nature and direction of the discipline of communication as we move into the twenty-first century.
Thesis
In our view, such redefinitions of the political arena have had direct and immediate consequences for the nature of the theories, methods and applications that control and guide cross-cultural and international communication. Indeed, it is the thesis of this essay that we are at the inception of a profound transformation of international political or power relationships, a transformation that has already begun to directly and profoundly change the nature of cross-cultural and international communication but equally important the standards we employ to judge and evaluate effective cross-cultural and international communication. In this regard, our thesis can aptly be perceived as a prediction, a conception we would not deny. But, we also believe that the implications of this prediction are manifest today in concrete and significant ways.
Given the scope of our thesis, five major lines of argument are developed in this analysis. First, an intentionally selective survey of international and crosscultural communication is provided, a survey that suggests that some powerful, if not extraordinary, innovations and transformations in thinking about international and cross-cultural communication is underway. Second, an historical analysis is provided that suggests that the theories of communication in the discipline have traditionally been guided by where the focus of political, military, economic, and social power resides. Indeed, while we recognize that variables such as technology can exert a significant influence over the formulation of theories in the discipline of communication, we are increasingly convinced that communication theories are power-derived, shaped and determined by the most powerful nation-state. Third, we suggest that a relatively new transformation in power is now underway in the world, a shift from a Western orientation to a more Eastern perspective that we anticipate will be most clearly dominated by China during the next twenty to forty years. Fourth, this shift in power suggests that different ways of conducting and analyzing international and cross-cultural communication are already emerging. To illustrate the nature of this shift, we examine the specific case study of how the United States and China handled the issues created when North Korea announced its nuclear testing policy in 2006. In our view, two different set of communication strategies were evoked to deal with this “international crisis.” Fifth and finally, several of the theoretical implications of this transformation are identified. With this overview in mind, we initially examine some of the essays published in the discipline of communication that provide a foundation for these lines of thought.
Survey of Literature
As a point of departure, we want to identify a series of recent essays that provide a disciplinary context for the perspective and orientation we adopt in this essay. In this context, we examine six essays. In one case, we are pointedly disturbed by one of the descriptions offered, although we admit that description has tremendous power. In most cases, we identify essays that we think are innovative and creative in terms of the change that we think the discipline of communication is already undertaking.
We begin this analysis by recognizing the outstanding contribution provided by Chung, Jeong, Chung and Park (2005). Using a meta-analysis, they conducted a content analysis of 782 books (413 from the United States and 369 from South Korea) published between 2002 and 2004. Chung, Jeong, Chung, and Park found differences in the rank ordering of mass communication topics, although essentially the same categories and topics dominated the research interests of both nations. And, in terms of their specific focus on “the status of communication research on the Internet in the U.S. and South Korea,” there were virtually no differences in the kind of research governing the phases examined. As the authors put it, “this pattern does not significantly vary between the nations” (p. 45) and more generally, “In the field of Internet research, the two nations do not seem significantly different” (p. 46). While we might expect that two such wildly different cultures would produce significantly different research agendas, each agenda reflecting the cultural orientation of each culture, such differences were not detected. Chung, Jeong, Chung, and Park (2005, p. 46) offer some reasons why such differences were not found: (1) 91% of the South Korean authors received their Ph.D.s in the United States; (2) Roughly one-quarter of the South Korean books were published in English in the United States and then translated into Korean; and (3) The Internet has “significantly” reduced the knowledge and information gap between nations. But, Chung, Jeong, Chung, and Park also offer a fourth reason for the commonality between communication research in the United States and South Korea, a reason we find particularly compelling in the context of this article. They argue that there is “a lack of theoretical identity and unique research agenda in the field of communication in South Korea” (p. 46).
In terms of the power we attribute to cross-cultural communication, we would expect that South Korea would and should have developed its own theoretical identity and research agenda to deal with its unique history, unique cultural, unique language, unique geographic context, and unique use of communication technologies. Yet, these unique cross-cultural variables do not emerge as significant variables when characterizing the theoretical identity and research agenda of South Korea. We hold, as Jandt (2004, p. 7) has argued that “A community or population [should be] sufficiently large enough to be self-sustaining” and able to “produce new generations of members without relying on outside peoples.” Even more relevant to this analysis, although it has been “slow to develop,” Jandt (2004, p. 7) has argued that the “ultimate goal” of the study of cross-cultural communication is to understand unique cultural systems “without imposing the belief that Western culture” is the context for understanding any specific non-Western culture. In all, then, while we tremendously value the findings and analysis provided by Chung, Jeong, Chung, and Park, we are equally concerned that the analysis may demonstrate that the United States may be exercising too much influence and control over the identity, knowledge, and development of non-Western cultures.
Within this context, we find Ono and Nakayama’s (2004) review of William Gudykunst’s (2001) Asian American Ethnicity and Communication intriguing. Ono and Nakayama are careful to note that much of the focus on Asian American communication has been “driven by a desire to address social concerns facing Asian Americans” within “the larger contexts of U.S. and global realities” (p. 88). At the same time, Ono and Nakayama argue that such a perspective “narrowly focuses on high context/low context cultures as a key comparative variable” (p. 89) as well as ignoring the “comparisons between Chinese and Chinese Americans, opting for a comparison between Chinese and (white) Americans which overlooks the numerous communication encounters between Chinese and Chinese Americas as well as the idea that Chinese Americans are Americans” (p. 90). Additionally, Ono and Nakayama express concern over the fact that Gudykunst “tends to privilege Western forms of expression” as well as failing to provide a comprehensive and critical assessment of the value given to “’assimilation’ paradigms’” in American crosscultural communication research” (p. 90). While additional limitations of the volume are vividly highlighted, we are particularly impressed by Ono and Nakayama’s observation that, “a focus on Asian history is also missing. Japan’s colonial domination of Korea, the Philippines, and China, for instance, may be key to the established identities of Japanese, Korean, Filipino, and Chinese communication, culture, and identity” (p. 91). In all, noting that Gudykunst’s volume “emphasizes acculturation into U.S. culture,” Ono and Nakayama persuasively argue that Gudykunst’s analysis “overlooks the political emergence of Asian American identity” (p. 93). In our view, the analysis offered by Ono and Nakayama provides a foundation for how transformations in international and cross-cultural communication is examined. Rather than dealing with ethnicity as a function of assimilation and acculturation, an analysis needs to recognize and focus explicitly on the political implications of cultural characterizations. In terms of recognizing the political implications of a cultural analysis, we find Yin’s (2006) analysis of China’s official newspaper, the People’s Daily, to be instructive. Based upon her textual and content analysis of the People’s Daily, Yin argues that, “The Chinese government is in fact colluding with the global capitalist system in the context of globalization, although at times it is at odds with advanced capitalist countries.” Indeed, legitimately identifying China’s authoritarian government role, its decision to regulate and control individual rights, and its tendency to respond to, if not be influenced by international corporations, Yin aptly concludes that the “news discourse” constructed by China about “globalization” is “in accordance with the interests of Chinese government and business elites” (p. 47). This political orientation, in her view, is “colluding with the global capitalist system in the context of globalization” (p. 48). In all, we conclude that while a host of factors exert an influence on international and cross-cultural communication, the political continues to remains a powerful force that cannot be ignored.
At the same time, what we know this powerful force to be must also be reassessed. In this regard we find Chang, Holt, and Luo’s (2006) analysis is particularly compelling.
Holding that it is now of “paramount importance” both for “practical and theoretical reasons,” Chang, Holt, and Luo (2006, p. 312) convincingly argue that a “Eurocentric orientation as the dominant paradigm for cross-cultural studies” has ultimately “limited” our understanding of Asian communication. Specifically, they note that “intercultural communication textbooks” have been examining East Asian cultures—such as China, Japan, and Korea—“vis-à-vis images of the West (i.e., Americans)” which provide, at best, “idiosyncratic” interpretations of these cultures (p. 313). In this regard, Chang, Holt, and Luo raise three issues.
First, they suggest that the dualistic East vs. West dichotomy does “not work effectively in the dynamic global world” nor does the dichotomy provide a method for transcending such a dichotomy (p. 319).
Second, while any analysis must necessarily reflect a set of value judgments, Chang, Holt, and Luo suggest that cross-cultural communication textbooks consistently “treat American rules as the standard against which others are to be judged” (p. 320), suggesting that it may now be appropriate to “redress a perceived imbalance” (p. 321).
Third and finally, Chang, Holt, and Luo suggest that the necessary conditions for any balanced crosscultural analysis may require that we shift from the use of a “dominant paradigm” when describing, interpreting and evaluating cultures and more explicitly consider the use “contextual and social milieus” that more aptly “constrain” the kind of historical and political generalizations that can be offered about any specific culture (p. 325).
Recognizing that “what counts as an Asian communication paradigm will continue to be contested,” Chang, Holt, and Luo suggest that “our understanding of Asian communication” should ultimately be “critical, self-reflective” and “treated as a moment in a stream of discourse where challenging ideas and perspective may be invoked as texts continue to be consumed, contested, and engaged by various readers, whether Asian or otherwise” (p. 326).
Recognizing—as Chang, Holt, and Luo has so concisely demonstrated–that any characterization about Asian communication is potentially contestable, we are particularly struck by Chen’s (2006) effort to deal with inherently self-contradictory yet simultaneously transcending characteristics of Asian communication. In our view, Chen centers our attention upon the most fundamental and profound tension characterizing and permeating Asian communication in all of its various forms, processes, and outcomes.
In this context, rather than argue the end or objective of human communication is to transform and change another, Chen has argued that the “essence of Asian communication” (p. 296) begins with a recognition that the dominant “ethic of human communication” is “to crystallize the duty of cooperation between interactants by a sincere display of mutually whole-hearted concern, rather than to use verbal or behavioral strategies to overcome one’s counterpart” (p. 298).
This harmony or interconnectedness is initially achieved by recognizing that “all things only become meaningful and perceivable in relation to others” (p. 298). In this regard, each entity “may possess different, diverse, or even opposite qualities, but through the interconnectedness of interaction, the synthesis of opposites or the identity in differences is found” (p. 299). Employing the dynamic interaction of master metaphors such as yin and yang to present this process, it is possible to view a host of specific communication methods—such as negation, paradox, and analogy/metaphor—as constituting a “highly logical and rational process of practice” of Asian communication (p. 304). When recognized as dominating characterizations, at best any description of Asian communication must aptly be viewed as tentative as well as subject to change.
At the same time, particularly given the analysis we offer below of the strategies of the United States and China when dealing with North Korea’s threat to test nuclear weapons, we would emphasize the attention Chen pays to “The Tao of Asian Communication Studies” at the conclusion of his essay. Chen suggests that conflict exists and will continue to exist, but that conflict itself can also provide a foundation for unity. As Chen (2006, p. 305) states the case:
Awareness of the identification and interpretation of yin and yang is the key that unlocks the mystery of Tao. The Tao is not merely the concept of the unity of dualities or the reconciliation of opposites, but also a unity in multiplicity, a wholeness of parts. It represents a realm of grand interfusion (da tong) that is free from all determinations and contradictions. And this is the ultimate goal of conducting Asian communication studies. As the ultimate goal of Asian Communication Studies, the Tao or the state of grand interfusion does not preclude the interaction of yin and yang in the phenomenal world, such as the struggle between the dichotomies embedded in Eastern/Western differences. Nevertheless, it demands an attitude in scholars of searching for similarities, an attitude that can reconcile and integrate differences between oriental and occidental scholars in the process of studying Asian communication in the a spirit of transcendence.
We want to conclude this survey of literature by drawing attention to a powerful essay by Miike (2006) that vividly articulates the significance and implications of recognizing the uniqueness and significance of Asian communication. Miike’s position is particularly clear: “The communication discipline is said to be particularly Eurocentric in origin and substance and to remain unreflexive on the Eurocentric nature of knowledge. . . .It is, therefore, extremely important to critique Eurocentrism in communication studies and promote non-Eurocentric approaches to communication” (p. 5). This basic objective leads Miike to propose “a fivepronged Asiacentric agenda for Asian communication studies. The first item of the proposed agenda lays a foundation for the other four items. Asiacentricity is the guiding principle of the entire agenda” (p. 13). Miike’s Asiacentric Agenda includes the following five principles:
1. Deriving Theoretical Insights from Asian Cultures.
2. Expanding the Geographical Focus of Study.
3. Comparing and Contrasting Asian Cultures.
4. Pluralizing and Historicizing Theoretical Lenses.
5. Confronting Metatheoretical and Methodological Questions. (pp. 13-22).
As we consider the biases of Western conceptions of the history of public address and communication theory in our next section, we would highlight Miike’s observation in the “Epilogue” of this 2006 essay:
By and large, Westerners are far less informed global citizens than non-Westerners because of their language of arrogance and ignorance. They have not yet realized that the rest of the world has a great deal to teach them. Westerners ought to understand the language of humility and modesty of non-Westerners. It is their turn to be diligent students of non-Western learning and abandon the role of being teachers at all times. They must pause to think about how to interact with non-Westerners given that old triumphant or confrontational Western modus operandi does not bring harmony and peace in the global village. (p. 23)
Several conclusions emerge from this survey of literature. First, the governing theoretical paradigm in the discipline of communication is increasingly recognized as culture-bound and serving specific cultural systems. Second, Asian communication governing concepts are ignored, but a host of essays are now beginning to recognize these exclusions. Third, a shift from a Western to Eastern emphasis has been articulated and increasingly seems justified.
A Critical/Cultural Analysis of the History of Public Address
We want to argue that historically the nature of communication theory and its standards for effectiveness have consistently undergone major and significant transformations for literally thousands of years. Indeed, in our view, it is the norm for the discipline of communication to follow the power and to fashion its theories and standards for effectiveness based upon those who are successful in controlling and manipulating others. In this sense, rather than constructed abstractly or based upon a priori conceptions of communication effectiveness, the theories of communication effectiveness recognized and published in the discipline of communication are derivative and they follow the flow and path of power.
Three historical conceptions of the discipline of communication drawn from the mid-twentieth century to the end of the twentieth century illustrate the case. We intentionally select these examples, because they were published some 20 years apart. They include:
1. Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism: The Development of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948).
2. Donald G. Douglas (Ed.), Philosophers on Rhetoric: Traditional and Emerging Views (Skokie, IL: National Textbook Company, 1973); and,
3. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg (Eds.), The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical times to the Present (Boston, MA: Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press, 1990).
For many, Thonssen and Baird’s 1948 Speech Criticism defined the foundation of the discipline of communication. The tradition they identify possesses “reach deep into the past,” with a “written tradition” that provides an unbroken record of intellectual probing into the operation of an ancient art.” Indeed, for Thonssen and Baird, the “force” of this “tradition” links “’generation to generation in the realm of mind’” (p. 27).
Yet, as we review this “tradition” now, it appears amazingly selective and ultimately reflects only a Western origination about the “intellectual” foundation of the discipline. In this regard, Thonssen and Baird maintain that the “ancient Greeks were the first to accord oratorical expression a place of distinction among the cultivated arts” (p. 29). The distinctions and conceptions of the ancient Greeks find their greatest expression in the works of Aristotle, a set of works that ultimately constitute a set of “interrelation of Greek and Roman thinking” (p. 77). This Greco-Roman tradition lead Thonssen and Baird to the fifth century and the writings of St. Augustine (pp. 110-114) which leads— Thonssen and Baird maintain—to the “First Rhetoric in the English Language,” a “first reasonably complete rhetoric” authored by Leonard Cox in the early sixteenth century (pp. 114). This transition to rhetorics written in English then lead Thonssen and Baird to summarize a wide range of rhetorics written in England during the modern era. Such a summary now appears pointedly incomplete, and indeed, it ignores the vast majority of the world’s cultures in the rendering it offers of the “ancient art of rhetoric.”
In 1972, Donald Douglas provided an analysis of “traditional and emerging views” of philosophers on rhetoric. The volume begins with two essays that define the meaning of “traditional” and “emerging” view of philosophers on rhetoric. For example, in Craig R. Smith and Donald G. Douglas’ essay, “Philosophical Principles in the Traditional and Emerging Views of Rhetoric” (pp. 15-22), virtually every reference is to a Greco-Roman rhetorician or philosopher from a Western European nation or the United States. The remaining historical eras include the Renaissance, Age of Enlightenment, Age of Utilitarian Philosophy, and the more recent philosophies of language popularized by Wittgenstein, John Langshaw Austin, and Bertrand Russell. Again, without exception, all of the historical eras and the spokespersons of these eras represent Western nation-states.
Finally, in 1990, Bizzell and Herzberg edit the massive 1,282 page volume, The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. This “large anthology” could “reintroduce the rich theoretical resources of rhetoric” as well as “broaden both the chronological and disciplinary scope of our project” (p. v). For Bizzell and Herzberg, the “Origins of Rhetoric” are to be found in the fifth century B.C.E. “when developed in Greek probate courts and flourished under Greek democracy” (p. 2). The existence and growth and development of rhetoric, if these words are literally read, was non-existent in the rest of the world. Indeed, “Part One” of the volume defines “Classical Rhetoric” operationally solely as the Greco-Roman era. This era is followed by “Medieval Rhetoric,” “Renaissance Rhetoric,” “Enlightenment Rhetoric,” and “Twentieth- Century Rhetoric,” all eras that feature scholars from Europe and the United States. The entire sweep of the rhetorical tradition is solely and pointedly only Western in its conception and worldview.
In all of these volumes, Asian communication and the various conceptions and theories characterizing Asian communication are virtually non-existent. In all, in these volumes, Western cultures are presumed to be the only sources of models and standards of communication standards, practices, and achievements. It might be noted that among historic1ans such a perspective is specifically identified as “Western.” In this regard, Osborne (2006) has rendered a new historical analysis entitled Civilization: A New History of the Western World. What is intriguing is that the historical line of development he provides for Western civilization is virtually the same as the historical development provided by these rhetorical historians. As Osborne puts it, “We like to believe that western civilization is something we have inherited from the ancient Greeks, the Romans and the Christian Church via the Renaissance, the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment” (p. 2). However, Osborne pointedly identifies his object of study as solely Western: “The following chapters comprise an investigation of western civilization” (p. 2).
Equally important is the fact that virtually all of these historical progressions follow the power and the money. In other words, as nation-states became dominant world powers, the rhetoric they employed is judged to be communicatively effectiveness. In one sense, we are not surprised by such a decision. The discipline of communication has been profoundly pragmatic in its orientation since its inception, guided first and foremost by a standard of what works or how to achieve a specific end in a communicative situation. Nonetheless, power itself is seldom explicitly mentioned as a criterion for identifying the origins of Western communication standards. Indeed, in many of these volumes, the reader is left with the distinct impression that artistic word choice is a primary standard for determining rhetorical effectiveness. The power itself of a nation-state is seldom identified as a variable determining if and when a nation is identified as the source of communicative effectiveness. The standards for selecting any particular nation-state as a primary source of the rhetorical tradition are simply not mentioned.
In all, two interim conclusions seem obvious. First, the last 2,500 year history of communication theory has been extremely selective. It has focused solely on developments within Western nations. Second, the historical pattern characterizing Western rhetoric is dominated by a pragmatic philosophy that implicitly posits that effectiveness should be operationally defined by what those in power do verbally and nonverbally.
If these two interims are correct, we anticipate that a kind of intellectual crisis is likely to happen in the discipline of communication during the next 25 years. We fully expect that China will increasingly emerge as one of the two dominant world powers, if not the dominant world power. Indeed, Barboza and Altman (2005, December 21, p. C1) have suggested that, “China could overtake the United States as early as 2035, at least five years earlier than previous projections.” If the pragmatic orientation of rhetoricians is to continue, they would follow the money and the power, and China and its various speakers would be featured as models and sources of communication effectiveness. However, the histories of rhetoric have thus far only featured Western nation-states. During the next twenty-five years, we think these two traditions are likely to come into conflict. Initially, we anticipate that civilization will continue to be defined in terms of Western traditions. During this period, we would not be surprised if the dominating power and symbol-using of China are redefined as the “growing importance of international markets and politics.” However, if the discipline of communication is to survive, it must adapt, and it must recognize the power of the pragmatic orientation that has guided it during the last one hundred years.
In this regard, it becomes appropriate to seriously consider the degree to which China is emerging as a world power and the degree to which it is displacing Western nations as it emerges within the international community.
From the 20th into the 21st Century: Transformations in International Power
As the world has moved from the 20th to 21st century, we believe that a massive transformation in international power has been underway, and we expect to see the full implications of this transformation during the next three to five decades. We particularly want to suggest that at its broadest level this transformation will see the power and strategies employed by the United States displaced by the emerging power and strategic alternatives of China and the eastern Asian community. Indeed, as each of the next several decades unfold, we believe that our thesis will gain increasing credibility.
The revolution of the Chinese economy opened a new chapter of international economic development and has initiated a huge transformation of the global economy. China is increasingly dominating and controlling the international balance of payments, and announcements of joint projects between China and international corporations are now commonplace.
By ways of an overview, the emergent power of China can be highlighted in three ways:
- Economy: China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown by an average rate of 10.3 percent during the 10th Five-Year Plan from 2001 to 2005. During the first quarter of 2007, China’s economy “continues to accelerate at a blistering pace, growing 11.1 percent in the first quarter of this year from the first quarter of 2006 (Barboza, 2007). This “burst of growth , one of the largest in a decade, came on the heels of four consecutive years of double-digital economic growth, including an increase last year of 10.7 percent, the fastest annual growth in a decade” (Barboza, 2007). Zheng Jingping (2005), spokesman of National Bureau of Statistics, anticipates that over the next five to ten years, China’s economy will attain an annual growth rate of 8 to 9 percent. Similarly, Zhang Xiaoji (2005), director of the Foreign Economic Relations Research Department, has argued that, “By 2020, the Nation’s GDP will reach US $4.7 million, or US $3,200 per capita (Xu, 2005).” In all, China has become the fourth most important economic power in the world, and it is shortly expected to rank as the third most important economic nation-state in the world.
- Military: Shah (2007) has argued that United States military spending is almost seven times larger than Chinese military spending. However, China is in the process of modernizing its military. Since the mid- 1990’s, China has increased its military spending by double digit rates (Anger & Shanker, 2005). In 2007, Kahn reported that “China’s official military budget for 2007 rose 18 percent to $45.3 billion, continuing a decade-long streak of double-digit increases. Even at that level, which the Pentagon maintains understates China’s actual defense outlays by a factor of two or three, China’s military budget in 2007 exceeds that of Japan and is fast approaching those of Britain and France, the largest military spenders after the United States” (also see: Sun, 2007). As its economic power increases, China’s military spending will also increase. Eventually, China’s military power is very likely to equal U.S. military power.
- Culture; As Yin (2006) has argued, China has given great attention to its economic growth and development. Less attention had been given to the development and expansion of individual freedoms. Some have argued that as China re-assumes an international political role, it may have no choice but to restore many of these freedoms. Indeed, the United States promised to drop its criticism of China if China showed signs of moving toward democracy. Shortly afterward, the Chinese government announced “the Plan for Democratization and Reconstruction” (2005). The plan called for the government to pay more attention to human rights. In addition the plan called for the reformation of the People’s Congress to increase the democratization of the party (Sakai, 2005). At the same time, others have pointedly suggested that China will continue to give priority to economic and military development, not political reform. As Kahn (2007, April 20, p. A1) has concluded, “China is not embracing Western-style democracy, even in theory. But by permitting a relatively open round of political discussions, President Hu Jintao and other top leaders have sought to cast themselves publicly as progressives who are open-minded about ways to improve government practices and reduce corruption.”
More generally, while progress since its 1978 economic revolution was initially slow, the last ten years have seen China emerge as a commanding presence on the global economic and political stage. For example, China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. China’s interaction with foreign companies has led to China exceeding Japan as the largest foreign exchange holder, and China is now ranked as the third-largest trading country in the world after the U.S. and Germany. This successful achievement is the result of the Chinese economic revolution, a revolution with quite a different political and historical background than that of western countries (Yong, 2006).
As a communist country, China had been demanding that its people believe in and live with the communistic theory of an economic and political system. However, these theories lacked the power to form a strong economy. As the Chinese people started to realize that their economic and cultural standards were falling behind of those of other countries, a movement to better the country’s economic status was essential. The reformation of 1978 led China to open itself to the outside world in order to achieve economic competency (Kapp, 1998).
The theory behind the economic reformation of 1978 is explained in Deng Xiaoping’s cat theory (“Say adieu to the Black Cat theory,” 2007). According to Deng’s theory, China shifted to a results-based idea of economic development. If this results-based initiative needed to embrace elements of capitalism that was acceptable as long as the desired results were achieved. The government encouraged many Chinese economic institutes to actively engage in economic development. As a result, the Chinese market was opened to foreign investment, and partnerships between Chinese and foreign companies have increased markedly.
Historically, a country that becomes a major economic power has always brought about economic disorder in smaller neighboring countries. As it emerges as a primary economic power, China keenly feels the need to establish and maintain cross-cultural communication with other countries.
In an attempt to mitigate China’s negative international image among its immediate neighbors Hu Jintao has substituted the term “peaceful development” for “peaceful rise” (Khan, 2006). This new terminology is considered an attempt to alleviate its neighbors concerns about Chinese ambitions. According to the survey by the Pew Global in 2006, half of Indians consider the economic growth of China as negative for India’s economy. However, both countries agreed there is a possibility that both might grow and established a 10-point strategy on November 2006. The strategy calls for India and China to double trade between the two countries to $40 billion by 2010. The combination of these two economies could essentially mean the end of the centuries of Western global economic dominance (Rai, 2006). Accordingly, we should not be surprised to see more countries set aside centuries of mutual suspicions in the cause of cooperative economic development.
China’s open-door policy has spurred direct foreign investment in the country. The biggest retailer in the U.S., Wal-Mart, now operates 73 stores in China. Wal- Mart may eventually take over the role of Trust- Mart as the biggest retailer in China. China’s market can be very tough because of extremely low prices and the strictness of China’s statecontrolled unions. Nonetheless, Wal-Mart still wants to expand their business in China. In a major concession, Wal-Mart has agreed to follow the standards of the state-controlled unions and has allowed the unions into almost all of its stores in China. Wal-Mart accepts these conditions because Wal-Mart knows China is not just a huge retail market but also an important goods supplier for Wal-Mart. Goods exported from China to Wal- Mart stores amounted to more than $ 9 billion last year (Barboza & Barbaro, 2007). Direct foreign investment through cooperative ventures is also growing. Chery Automobile Company signed a contract with Chrysler in January, 2007 to produce small cars in China. Within the next two or three years these cars will be exported to other countries with the approval of the Chinese government (“Chrysler in Deal With Chinese Automaker,” 2007). Many other world famous automobile companies are already producing their products or significant parts for their products in China. However, the Chery/Chrysler contract represents an important cooperative venture. As these cooperative ventures grow they can be expected to have a strong impact on the international economic system.
Accordingly, in our view, China’s massive growth can be attributed to its openness to forging new alliances across borders. In other words, by adopting a policy of international cooperation China has seen strong economic growth, and we can expect this international cooperation strategy to continue as long as economic growth remains China’s top priority.
Communication Strategies in the East and West: The Case of North Korea
The political transformation of power from the United States to China and the eastern Asian community will be particularly important for the study of communication in terms of dominant international strategies and ultimately the nature of cross-cultural and international communication theory itself. In this regard, we hold that the United States has—at key moments in its international relationships—employed confrontation as its primary strategy, while China has—to date— revealed a tendency toward the short-term use of consensus and compromise and a long-term use of collaboration as its primary strategy for dealing with international conflicts. These strategic differences are already evident internationally, and the North Korean nuclear arms issue function as an apt case study for identifying and evaluating these strategic differences.
Initially it is important to recognize that international and cross-cultural communication can be carried out with a wide range of strategies. Chesebro has complied several of these strategies into a “conflict model” (see Table 1), identified eight major communication strategies–competition, consensus or compromise, selfdefense or apologia, concession, confrontation, avoiding or silence, collaboration, and accommodation, and characterized the formal and substantial characteristic of each of these communication strategies. This model of eight communication strategies for managing conflict can be applied to virtually all levels of the communication process, from the interpersonal to the international level. In an athletic game, for instance, the statements made by a losing team or player reflects the use of a common strategy which Chesebro has identified as a concession in terms of the eight communication strategies.
In this regard, each of the strategies is distinguished in terms of its unique traits along nine formal and substantive characteristics, including level of assertiveness, level of cooperation, concern for the self, concern for others, getting the task done, the degree of its prosocial emphasis, the apparent emotional state of those using the strategy, the conflict style employed, and finally, the implicit approach the social system implied or explicitly conveyed in using the strategy. In terms of international relations, the formal and substantive characteristic of this model provide a useful method for evaluating communication strategies. Moreover in terms of usefulness, the conflict model allows one to, not only define an appropriate communication strategy, but also to compare the chosen strategy to the other remaining strategies. In this regard, the eight communication strategies for managing conflict are useful in comprehending two countries’ different political strategies, in this case the United States and China, on North Korea’s nuclear issue. While generalizations can be problematic, as we examine the North Korea case, China has been consistent in how it has reacted to and handled North Korea. Traditionally China has employed a low-profile diplomatic posture and a long-held principle of noninterference in other countries’ affairs (Yuan, 2006). However, as it assumes a larger role on the world’s political stage, China has had to modify its international strategy. China therefore has used a consensus or compromise strategy in the short run and collaboration in the long term in dealing with North Korea. The United States, in contrast, has primarily used competition in the short run, and confrontation in the long run, as its strategies in dealing with North Korea.
China’s traditional diplomatic hegemony in eastern Asian community was a critical factor in North Korea’s return to the negotiation table. On October 3, 2006, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement asserting that, “Pyongyang will in the future conduct a nuclear test under the condition where safety is firmly guaranteed.” Following this announcement, nearly every world power called for strong sanctions against North Korea. However Wang Guangya, China’s U.N. ambassador, announced that “the door to solve this issue from a diplomatic point of view is still open.” Chinese diplomats sought a more reasonable and mutually beneficial solution - the characteristics of consensus or compromise strategy. Nevertheless, October 9, 2006 the state-run Korean Central News Agency reported “North Korea successfully conducts an underground nuclear test under secure conditions.” This nuclear test provoked not only international resentments, but also United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 with strong trade and financial sanctions.
Despite its approval of this resolution, China used continued to use consensus or compromise strategy, a different communication strategy from that which most other countries, including the United States employed. Li Zhaoxing, Chinese Foreign Minister, noted, “We hope all relevant parties will maintain cool-headedness, adopt a responsible approach and adhere to peaceful dialogue as the main approach.” Hu Jintao sent special envoys to the United States and Russia and dispatched delegates to North Korea headed by Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan. Two days after Councilor Jiaxuan’s visit, North Korea’s reclusive leader, Jung-Il Kim, made an agreement to rejoin the Six-Party Talks. Finally, on February 13, 2007, the Six-Party Talks released its integrated declaration, specifically that North Korea had agreed to nuclear disarmament. China’s communication strategy of compromise and collaboration appears to have been more successful than the United States and other world powers’ use of competition and confrontation strategies.
The overall purpose of the American strategy for foreign policy has been to defend the American way of life (Lind, 2006, p.22). Accordingly, America’s international communication strategy is to challenge and ultimately eliminate things that threaten the American way of life through a policy of competition and confrontation. The eight communication strategies for managing conflict define competition and confrontation strategies as a low level of concern for others, while a concern for self and level of assertiveness are high. Subsequently these strategies provoke, unintentionally, anti-cooperation in others and prevent a diplomatic understanding. As an example, the United States is primarily using a confrontation strategy in managing international conflict such as the Iraq and Afghan wars. In these conflicts, the level of assertiveness is high, the level of cooperation is low (we do not deal with terrorists), the concern for self is high, the concern for others is low (evident in the lack of planning for the post-war recovery phase), getting the task done is high, prosocial is high, the apparent emotional state is anger, the conflict style is morally indignant, and the approach to the system is that the current system is corrupt and needs to be destroyed.
We know of no clear exception to our claim that the United States has consistently employed the competition and confrontation strategies when dealing with the North Korea nuclear issue. Throughout the entire time, from North Korea’s first nuclear test announcement to the resumption of the six-party talks, the U.S government has made statements consistent with competition and confrontation communication strategies. For example, in a formal international address, President Bush proclaimed that, “The United States condemns this provocative act,” and he pledged to continue to pressure the United Nations Security Council for “serious repercussions” for North Korea. Moreover Chris Hill, Assistant Secretary of State, announced that the nuclear test was a “very, very costly mistake, Jung-Il Kim is going to really rue the day that he made this decision.” Through aggressive styles of communication, the United States government proposed to use a competition strategy for managing this conflict in the short term one. And as a long term run strategy, the United States has used confrontation strategies. For example, after Jung-Il Kim pledged disarmament through the Chinese delegate, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice cast doubt on the report, saying Pyongyang was bent on escalating the crisis. She maintained that the United States was leaving open a path to negotiation through the Six-Party Talks, but only if Pyongyang returns to the talks without condition. Finally she concluded her announcement: “I believe we’ll get a very good resolution that will demonstrate to the North Koreans that the international community is very much united in its condemnation of this test that was carried out a couple of days ago.” Rice’s statements constitute a classic example of the confrontation strategy, for she challenged the right of corporations to function internationally and simultaneously maintained that North Korea’s political system was corrupt and could appropriately be destroyed.
Eventually, however, the Bush administration seemed to partially adopt somewhat the Chinese model of consensus and compromise. Ms. Rice ultimately maintained that North Korea’s reentry to the Six-Party Talks could be permitted without any precondition. Several days later, Hill also promised the cancellation of North Korea’s financial sanctions within 30 days. As a result, the Six-Party Talks made an integrated declaration at February 13, 2007 announcing the North Korean nuclear disarmament. The United States’ strategic “adjustment” occurred at the end of the negotiations and this “adjustment” is still perceived as controversial among U.S State Department personnel and the President’s cabinet.
Of the host of possible conclusions that can be drawn from this extended example, it seems clear that China has consistently employed compromise as a short term communication strategy and collaboration as a long term communication strategy, and these strategies pierced the kernel in the North Korea nuclear issue. In this particular foreign policy crisis, the communication strategies derived from a concern for others seem to have been more successful in terms of outcomes in an international and cross-cultural communication environment. In this regard, we might also note that the strategies employed by China during the North Korea nuclear crisis constitute an almost perfect example of Chen’s (2006, pp. 296 & 298) claim that the “essence of Asian communication” is to hold display both a “sincere” and “mutually whole-hearted concern” for cooperation among interactants and to perceived differences and diverse oppositions as components of the “interconnectedness of interaction.”
Towards Some New Theoretical Explorations
In this concluding section, we want to identify some of the theoretical implications of this international power and strategic shift. With some self-consciousness, our theoretical implications predominantly fall with the domain of the heuristic and theoretical functions. In this context, several implications emerge.
Global
Since the world became dramatically reformed by the rise of China, the need to shift from a nation-state perspective to a truly global orientation has been keenly felt. As we argued earlier, we believe communication theories are power-derived, shaped and determined by the powerful. As China’s economical, political, and military power grows, the shift in the context of the international and cross-cultural communication will continue. Correspondingly, we anticipate that a single nation-state perspective will only be highly problematic in a global environment in which conflict is understood to exist with a context of interconnectedness, mutually interactions, and goaded by a desire for cooperation.
Strategic Shift
In terms of conflict resolution, even when there is an imbalance in the military and economic power of two nation-states, the most successfully employed strategies will be those that shift attention from dominance and control to negotiated outcomes. It would convenient to hold that consensus, compromise, and collaboration are the most effective strategies to employ when dealing with international conflict. And, it would be equally convenient to hold that consensus, compromise, and collaboration are the strategies employed when Asian communication systems operate. However, the limitations of such claims must be immediately recognized. The consensus, compromise, and collaboration strategies have been effective for China during an extremely specific situation involving a particular issue and two other particular nation-states. Likewise, Asian communications systems do not universally and consistently employ consensus, compromise, and collaboration.
The strategic shift identified here is a shift from a single nation-state perspective in which selfdetermination controls the decisions and policies of the nation-state (a Western orientation) to a framework in which conflicts are perceived as the interactions of interconnected nation-states employing mutually selfdefining verbal and nonverbal symbols (an Asian orientation). Cast in this fashion, the strategic shift from a Western to Asian communication perspective is likely to emphasize the tentative, ongoing and transformative nature of a communicative interaction. In this regard, the decision to view dichotomies–such as the individualistic-collectivistic dimension–as enduring conceptions of cross-cultural communication is unlikely to be viewed as relevant and useful when dealing with dynamic and ever-changing international interactions and conflicts.
Redefinition of the Primary Sources of Communication
Traditionally, cross-cultural and international communication theory has implicitly presumed that the United States and Western cultural systems are an appropriate foundation for defining what are appropriate and successful communication processes and outcomes. We anticipate that as the primary sources of communication in cross-cultural and international communication shift to China and more generally and, in the long-run, to the entire block of eastern Asian countries including nation-states–such as Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia–the definition of what constitutes an appropriate and successful communication process and outcome will change dramatically.
Correspondence to:
James W. Chesebro, Jung Kyu Kim, & Donggeol Lee Department of Telecommunications 201 Ball Communication Building Ball State University, 2000 West University Avenue Muncie, IN 47306-0540, USA
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[1] For one of the most complete and clearest summaries of all of these strategic forms, see: (1) J. Dan Rothwell, In the Company of Others: An Introduction to Communication (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 2000), pp. 246-274, esp. pp. 253-257; and/or (2) Thomas E. Harris and John C. Sherblom, Small Group and Team Communication (3rd ed.) (Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc./Allyn and Bacon, 2005), pp. 248-255.
[2] Assuming that a zero-sum situation exists in which it is determined that only one of all opponents can win, conflict is resolved when a set of strategies is designed to gain what others seek to gain at the same time and usually under fair or equitable rules and circumstances. Under such circumstances, one “winner” is generally designated, because one set of strategies did, in fact, achieve what others sought following the same procedures.
[3] Presuming that differences are a matter of opinion rather than ideological, a consensus seeks to resolve conflict by creating an identification or merger of common and shared interests and identities between/among opponents; see: Howard H. Martin and C. William Colburn, Communication and Consensus: An Introduction to Rhetorical Discourse (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972).
[4] By employing techniques such as shifting responsibility, denying accusations, and attacking the opponent, when employing an apologia or selfdefense strategy, an advocate attempts to justify what others have perceived as wrongdoing and thereby deny the validity of the conflict; see: Lawrence W. Rosenfield, “A Case Study in Speech Criticism: The Nixon-Truman Analog,” Speech Monographs, 35 (November 1968), 435-450. Also, see: David A. Ling, “A Pentadic Analysis of Senator Edward Kennedy’s Address to the People of Massachusetts, July 25, 1969, Central States Speech Journal, 21 (Summer 1970), 81-86.
[5] Chesebro and Hamsher (p.39) have defined a concession as “a formal conceding or yielding in a conflict after the issues have been resolved in face”; see: James W. Chesebro and Caroline D. Hamsher, “The Concession Speech: The MacArthur-Agnew Analog,” Speaker and Gavel, 11 (January 1974), pp. 39-54.
[6] Lacking a common decision-making structure and ideological base that would allow consensus to occur, confrontations are designed to eliminate conflict by symbolically or actually destroying the institutions, agents, sources, or symbols of power of adversaries; see: Herbert W. Simons, “Persuasion in Social Conflicts: A Critique of Prevailing Conceptions and a Framework for Future Research,” Speech Monographs, 39 (November 1972), 227-247. Also, see: Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith, “The Rhetoric of Confrontation,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 55 (February 1969), 1-8. For a more fundamental perspective, see: Richard Conniff, “Rethinking Primate Aggression,” Smithsonian, 34 (August 2003), Number 5, pp. 60-67.
[7] While it can convey a wide range of messages because of its ambiguous nature both verbally and nonverbally, avoidance or silence seeks to resolve a conflict by refusing to recognize the conflict, address the issues involved in the conflict, and/or participating in techniques that directly resolve the conflict; see: Robert L. Scott, “Rhetoric and Silence,” Western Speech, 36 (Summer 1972), 146- 158; also, see: Cheryl Glenn, Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2004). At the same time, it must be recognized that this strategy can sustain a conflict because it fails to address the conflict directly.
[8] Collaboration is a form of conflict resolution in which it is believed that agreement can be reached if “both sides” of a conflict are “fully articulated and address” with an “open-minded attitude,” honest and sincere “effort,” and with “effective communication”; see: Deborah Borisoff and David A. Victor, Conflict Management: A Communication Skills Approach, 2nd edition (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1998), p. 39.
[9] Accommodation is an adjustment or harmonizing conflict-resolution strategy that seeks to create agreement or concord by changing the habits or customs that create a conflict, supplying something that is convenient, being helpful or useful to others, or by furnishing something others desire or need.
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